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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
DAVID E. HUNSAKER : Case No. 20030593-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for enticing a minor over the 
Internet, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 76-4-401 
(Supp. 2002). Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002) authorizes this Court 
to entertain appeals from cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The definition of the crime of enticing a minor over the Internet ("Internet 
enticement statute") requires the State to prove that a person has not committed an 
attempt or solicitation crime but at the same time has solicited, seduced, lured, or enticed 
a minor to engage in prohibited sexual acts or has attempted to do so. Is the requirement 
of proving both the existence and the non-existence of an attempt or solicitation 
internally inconsistent, thus requiring the legislature to amend it? 
This Court reviews the interpretation of a statute for correctness. State v. Cox, 
826 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Trial counsel preserved this issue by filing a 
motion to dismiss the charges because the Internet enticement statute was internally 
inconsistent. R. 54-58. 
2. A statute is unconstitutionally vague when it fails to provide persons of 
ordinary intelligence notice of prohibited conduct and when the statute's language 
encourages arbitrary enforcement. The Internet enticement statute requires the State to 
prove both the existence and the nonexistence of a solicitation or an attempt and grants 
law enforcement officials broad discretion in determining what conduct is prohibited. Is 
the Internet enticement statute unconstitutionally vague? 
The question of whether a statute is vague presents a legal question which this 
Court reviews for correctness. Provo City v. Thompson, 2002 UT App 63, TflO, 44 P.3d 
828. Defense counsel argued in his motion below that the Internet enticement statute 
was unconstitutionally vague. R. 58-61. 
3. Do the contradictory provisions of the Internet enticement statute sufficiently 
define a crime that would allow a jury to determine what conduct is prohibited? This 
Court interprets statutory language for correctness. Cox, 826 P.2d at 662. Defense 
counsel requested the trial judge to dismiss the enticement charge because a jury cannot 
understand the conflicting terms of the Internet enticement statute. R. 62. 
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STATUTORY PROVISION 
At the time the State filed charges in this case, Utah Code Annotated section 76-4-
401 defined the crime of enticing a minor over the Internet as follows: 
(1) A person commits enticement of a minor over the 
Internet when, not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or 
solicitation under Section 76-4-101,76-4-201, or 76-4-203, the 
person knowingly uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or 
entice, or attempt to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a 
person the defendant believes to be a minor to engage in any 
sexual activity which is a violation of state criminal law. 
(2) It is not a defense to the crime of enticing a minor 
under Subsection (1), or an attempt to commit this offense, that 
a law enforcement officer or an undercover operative who is 
working with a law enforcement agency was involved in the 
detection or investigation of the offense. 
(3) An enticement of a minor under Subsection (1) with 
the intent to commit: 
(a) a first degree felony is a second degree felony; 
(b) a second degree felony is a third degree felony; 
(c) a third degree felony is a class A misdemeanor; 
(d) a class A misdemeanor is a class B misdemeanor; and 
(e) a class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-4-401 (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 2, 2002, the State charged Mr. Hunsaker with two counts of violating the 
Internet enticement statute. R. 18. After Mr. Hunsaker waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing, a magistrate bound over the case to the district court for trial. R. 45. On 
November 18, 2002, Mr. Hunsaker filed a motion to declare the Internet enticement 
statute unconstitutional. R. 51. Mr. Hunsaker argued that the statute was internally 
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inconsistent, unconstitutionally vague, and so convoluted that a jury could not 
understand what conduct was prohibited. R. 54-62. The State opposed the motion. R. 
71. The trial court denied the motion at a hearing and in a written order. R. 99, 147: l l .1 
On January 13, 2003, Mr. Hunsaker pleaded guilty to one count of violating the 
Internet enticement statute. R. 89. Mr. Hunsaker also preserved his right to appeal his 
challenges to the statute. IcL On June 30, 2003, the trial court sentenced Mr. Hunsaker 
to a term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. R. 126; 148: 6; Addendum. Mr. 
Hunsaker filed a timely notice of appeal on July 21, 2003. R. 131. Mr. Hunsaker 
remains incarcerated pending the outcome of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 1, 2002, Mr. Hunsaker was conversing in an Internet chat room using the 
name "earthsreddragon." R. 72. Mr. Hunsaker contacted another user named f,leslilel3n 
who claimed to be a 13-year old girl. R. 53. Actually, leslilel3 was an undercover 
police detective posing as a teenager. IcL While conversing, Mr. Hunsaker arranged to 
meet leslileB at a park in Murray, Utah to engage in vaginal and oral sex. R. 73. 
Later that evening, Mr. Hunsaker arrived at the park, approached a police decoy, 
^he transcript marked 147 contains the record of the hearing on the motion to 
declare the Internet enticement statute unconstitutional. The transcript marked 148 
contains the sentencing hearing transcript. The internal page numbers of those 
transcripts are included after "R." and the record number. 
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and was arrested by police agents. R. 73. Mr. Hunsaker admitted to arranging to meet 
with leslilel3. IdL The police searched Mr. Hunsaker and found condoms and a piece of 
paper with nleslilel3ff written on it along with the address of the park. Id. 
The State charged Mr. Hunsaker with two counts of Internet enticement of a 
minor. R. 18. Mr. Hunsaker waived his right to a preliminary hearing and the trial court 
bound him over to the district court for trial. R. 45. On November 18, 2002, Mr. 
Hunsaker filed a motion to declare the Internet enticement statute unconstitutional. R. 
51. He argued that the Internet enticement statute was conflicting because it required the 
State to prove that his actions did not fl'amount[] to5" an attempt or solicitation crime but 
also required the State to establish the existence of an attempt or solicitation while using 
the Internet. R. 51-54 (quoting Utah Code Ann. section 76-4-401 (Supp. 2002)). Mr. 
Hunsaker argued further that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and failed to define 
a crime for a jury given its contradictory requirements. R. 54-62. 
The State opposed the motion, citing to cases that had interpreted similar language 
in other statutes as not requiring the State to prove the non-existence of another crime. 
R. 73-76. These cases hold that the phrase "not amounting to" another crime was meant 
to encourage the filing of more serious charges when the facts supported stiffer penalties. 
Id. The State claimed further that the Internet enticement statute was sufficiently clear to 
alert reasonable persons of the prohibited conduct. R. 76-80. 
At a hearing on the motion, the hearing judge agreed with the State's reliance on 
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other cases and ruled that the Internet enticement statute encouraged the filing of more 
serious charges for first degree attempt crimes as provided for under Title 76, Chapter 5, 
part 4 of the Utah Code Annotated. R. 147: 3, 11. That part defines several attempt 
crimes as first degree felonies requiring sentences of three years to life. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-102(2)(c) (Supp. 2003) (defining first degree felonies for attempt crimes 
involving sex with children). The hearing judge ruled further that the Internet 
enticement statute was not contradictory, vague, or incoherent. R. 99, 147: 10-11. 
On January 13, 2003, Mr. Hunsaker pleaded guilty to one count of Internet 
enticement. R. 89. Mr. Hunsaker also preserved his right to appeal his challenges to the 
Internet enticement statute. Id On June 30, 2003, the trial court sentenced Mr. 
Hunsaker to a term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. R. 126; 148: 6; 
Addendum. This appeal followed. R. 131. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erroneously ruled that the Internet enticement statute clearly stated 
a crime even though that statute's language directly contradicts. That statute requires the 
State to prove both that a person has not committed a solicitation or attempt crime but 
simultaneously has solicited, enticed, or lured a minor to engage in sexual activity or has 
attempted to do so. Because this plain language requires proof of both the existence and 
nonexistence of an attempt or solicitation, the statute is internally inconsistent. 
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Even if this contradictory language created some ambiguity, no legislative history 
helps to determine the legislature's intent in creating contradictory requirements. 
Likewise, even though the purpose of the statute may be plain—protecting minors from 
sexual predators—the conflicting provisions of the statute provide no means of 
accomplishing the purpose. Rather, the Internet enticement statute states no crime at all. 
The intent requirement for the Internet enticement statute supports the 
irreconcilable inconsistency of that statute. To avoid free speech prohibitions, the 
Internet enticement, solicitation, and attempt statutes all must criminalize the act of 
intending to lure a minor as opposed to banning mere thought or speech. Thus, these 
three statutes address the exact same conduct. Because the Internet enticement statute 
requires the existence and the non-existence of the very same activity, it is directly 
contradictory. 
Moreover, the hearing judge's reliance on similar statutes was misplaced. The 
"not amounting to" language in those statutes encourages the filing of more serious sex 
crimes. In contrast, the Internet enticement statute creates an inchoate offense that 
addresses specific conduct and does not encourage the filing of more serious crimes. As 
evidence of the legislature's intent, the legislature recently amended the Internet 
enticement statute to eliminate its f,not amounting to" language. Had the legislature 
wanted to encourage the pursuit of more serious offenses, it could have specifically 
indicated in its amendment or otherwise made that intent clear. 
7 
When the words of a statute are plain but contradictory, the separation of powers 
doctrine requires this Court to invalidate the law and return it to the legislature for 
redrafting. Although this Court has power to interpret statutory language, this case 
presents an irreconcilable inconsistency which only the legislature can correct. Any 
attempt to remedy the Internet enticement statute would require this Court to engage in 
legislative redrafting which is barred under the separation of powers doctrine. Because 
the legislature has already amended the statute and removed the conflicting requirements, 
this Court need only reverse Mr. Hunsaker's conviction. 
The conflicting provisions of the Internet enticement statute also render it 
unconstitutionally vague. Due process requires criminal statutes to give persons notice 
of prohibited conduct. When, as here, a statute conflicts and commands opposing 
requirements, that statute is unconstitutionally vague. The Internet enticement statute 
also grants broad discretion to law enforcement officials to determine whether a person 
simply believes he or she is communicating with a minor. This faulty language 
unconstitutionally affords the police unfettered discretion to apply the statute. 
The flaws in the Internet enticement statute also make it impossible for a jury to 
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the conflicting provisions of the statute, no 
reasonable juror could convict a person of both the nonexistence of an attempt or a 
solicitation crime and the existence of those same offenses. Statutes fail when they do 
not specify the elements required to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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ARGUMENT 
Because the Internet enticement statute is contradictory and conflicting, it violates 
several fundamental constitutional doctrines that render it invalid. First, because that 
statute is internally inconsistent and irreconcilable, the separation of powers doctrine 
requires the legislature to correct it. Second, the statute is so vague that it fails to give 
reasonable persons notice of prohibited criminal conduct and grants broad discretion to 
law enforcement in applying it. Third, given the contradictory terms of the statute, a jury 
cannot determine what conduct constitutes a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
convoluted terms of the statute require reversal of Mr. Hunsaker's conviction. 
I. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
D O C T R I N E R E Q U I R E S T H E 
LEGISLATURE TO REDRAFT THE 
INTERNET ENTICEMENT STATUTE 
BECAUSE THE STATUTE DIRECTLY 
CONTRADICTS ITSELF. 
The Internet enticement statute is so conflicting and contradictory that this Court 
must invalidate it. That statute requires the State to prove that a person has not 
committed the crimes of attempt or solicitation but then obligates the State to show that a 
person has used a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or has attempted to 
do so. This language requires the State to prove both the nonexistence and the existence 
of the same crime. Further, the Internet enticement statute does not create a separate 
offense because it addresses the exact same conduct as solicitation and attempt crimes. 
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Moreover, neither the legislative history nor rules of statutory construction saves the 
statute. Because the competing terms of the Internet enticement statute cannot be 
reconciled, the separation of powers doctrine requires the legislature to amend the statute. 
A. The Plain Language Of the Internet 
Enticement Statute Is Internally Inconsistent 
The trial court convicted Mr. Hunsaker under an invalid criminal statute. When 
statutory language is plain but "internally inconsistent," this Court must invalidate the 
statute. Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995). Because the 
commonly understood meanings of the terms in the Internet enticement statute plainly 
require the State to prove the existence and the nonexistence of a solicitation or attempt 
crime, the terms of that statute cannot be reconciled. 
The terms of the Internet enticement statute create an obvious conflict. 
Specifically, that statute excludes from its definition all attempts or solicitations crimes, 
but, at the same time, requires the defendant to "solicit, seduce, lure, or entice" a minor to 
engage in sex or to "attempt" to do so: 
A person commits enticement of a minor over the Internet 
when, not amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation 
under Section 76-4-101, 76-4-201, or 76-4-203, the person 
knowingly uses a computer to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice, or 
attempt to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor or a person the 
defendant believes to be a minor to engage in any sexual 
activity which is a violation of state criminal law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2002). 
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These plain words negate each other. In interpreting statutes, this Court must 
"seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the act was 
meant to achieve." Gutierrez v. Medley. 972 P.2d 913, 915 (Utah 1998). In doing so, 
this court first looks "'to the plain language of the [statute].'" IcL This Court "need not 
look beyond the plain language of [the] provision unless [this Court] find[s] some 
ambiguity in it." In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 1996). 
The plain language of the Internet enticement statute directly contradicts by 
requiring the State to prove both the existence and nonexistence of an attempt or a 
solicitation crime. The Utah Code defines a solicitation as occurring when a person 
"solicits, requests, commands, offers to hire, or importunes another person to" commit 
what the person requesting believes is a felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-203(1) (1999). 
The actor's conduct must also be "strongly corroborative" of that person's intent. IcL at § 
76-4-203(2). 
The plain dictionary definitions of the terms describing solicitation show that this 
crime covers a wide spectrum of conduct that embodies the same conduct described 
under the Internet enticement statute. State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, ^12, 73 
P.3d 978 (using dictionary definition to show that "ordinary and commonly understood 
meaning" of statutory language was same as used in statute). On one end, a solicitation 
occurs when a person merely "request[s]ff another person to commit a felony. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-203(1) (1999). The definition for request is simply "to express a wish or 
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desire for; ask for, especially] in a polite or formal way." Webster's New World College 
Dictionary at 1218 (4th Ed. 1999) (referred to as "Webster's"). On the other end of the 
spectrum, a person "importunes" another by "troubling] with requests or demands; 
urg[ing] or entreat[ing] persistently or repeatedly." Id. at 717. Thus, a solicitation occurs 
when a person politely requests or persistently urges another to commit a felony. 
These broad definitions folly encompass the terms listed in the Internet enticement 
statute. First, because that statute uses the word "solicit," it plainly intends to define a 
crime as under the solicitation statute. Second, the Internet enticement statute's language 
lists synonymous terms that are closely aligned with the definition for solicitation. That 
statute defines a crime when a person uses a computer "to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice" 
a minor to engage in illicit sex. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (2002). Dictionaries 
conclude that the terms seduce, lure, and entice are synonyms that mean to "persuade," 
"tempt," or "attract" someone to do something wrong or immoral. Webster's at 475, 855-
56, 1297; http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary (Internet cite for the American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4 th Ed. 2000)). Like the terms describing 
solicitation, the connotations of these words express a similar spectrum of conduct. Lure 
implies "an irresistible force," entice suggests "skill" in tempting, while seduce indicates 
"enticement" to do a morally wrongful act. Webster's at 856. Although not a synonym, 
solicit is similarly defined as "to tempt or entice someone to do wrong." IcL at 1364. 
These near-identical meanings fall well within the range of a solicitation crime which 
12 
encompasses a mere request to persistent urging to commit a crime. Id. at 717. 
Similarly, an attempt under the Internet enticement statute fits within the 
definition of an attempt crime. An attempt crime occurs when a person "acting with the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he [or she] 
engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(1) (1999). Like solicitation, the substantial step must be 
"strongly corroborative" of the person's intent. Id_ at § 76-4-101(2). Because the plain 
language of the Internet enticement statute requires the nonexistence of an attempt, the 
State must prove that a person either lacks the "culpability" required to commit a crime, 
has not taken a substantial step toward completing the offense, or has not demonstrated 
conduct strongly corroborative of an intent to commit a crime. IdL. But, that same statute 
simultaneously requires the State to show an "attempt to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a 
minor" to engage in sexual activity. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401 (Supp. 2002). It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a situation where a person "attempts] to 
solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor" without also intending to commit a crime, taking a 
substantial step toward the completion of a crime, or engaging in conduct strongly 
corroborative of an intent to engage in criminal activity. Id. These competing 
requirements state no crime at all; rather, they entirely negate each other. 
These contradictions are identical to the conflicting phrases in the elections statute 
in Nelson. That statute gave county commissioners discretion to terminate an election 
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under a citizens initiative but also required them to hold an election unless a majority of 
signatories on the initiative withdrew their support. Nelson, 905 P.2d at 875-76 
(construing former Utah Code Annotated section 10-2-102.8(2)). The Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that the plain language of the elections statute was "patently inconsistent" 
and "contradictory" because it simultaneously required an election and exempted one at 
the same time. LcL at 876. The Internet enticement statute's requirement to prove both 
the existence and the nonexistence of a solicitation or an attempt is equally conflicting. 
B. The Internet Enticement Statute Directly 
Conflicts Because It Requires the Same Intent 
to Commit a Crime As Solicitation and 
Attempt Crimes. 
The Internet enticement statute is further contradictory because it targets the exact 
same conduct~the intent to commit a crime-that is addressed in the solicitation and 
attempt statutes. Because the First Amendment bars proscribing mere thought or speech, 
all three statutes must address conduct rather than the content of a person's speech to 
avoid free speech prohibitions. All three statutes satisfy free speech requirements by 
proscribing the act of intending to commit a crime. This focus on the same intent in all 
three statutes confirms that the Internet enticement statute bans the exact same conduct 
that the statute also requires to exist to establish a crime. As a result, the Internet 
enticement statute is blatantly contradictory. 
Free speech restrictions render the Internet enticement, solicitation, and attempt 
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statutes as addressing identical conduct. Because the First Amendment bars the 
punishing of mere thoughts or words, inchoate crimes such as solicitation and attempt 
require corroboration that those thoughts or words portend future illegal conduct. Wayne 
R. LaFave, 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 11.1(b) at 193 (2d. Ed. 2003); People v. Foley , 
731 N.E.2d 123, 129 (N.Y.), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 875 (2000). To avoid free speech 
concerns, Utah's solicitation and attempt statutes both require that an accused person's 
actions be "strongly corroborative of the actor's intent" to commit an offense. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-4-101(2), 76-4-203(2) (1999). 
The Internet enticement statute avoids First Amendment issues by requiring sexual 
speech with minors to be given for the intent of "engaging] in any sexual activity which 
is a violation of state criminal law." Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2002). This 
requirement is identical to the solicitation and attempt statutes' directive to establish 
conduct "strongly corroborative" of intent. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101(2), 76-4-
203(2) (1999). Thus, this corroboration requirement for inchoate offenses serves as no 
distinction between solicitation and attempt from Internet enticement. Rather, all three 
crimes target the same intent. 
Numerous other courts agree that similar Internet solicitation statutes survive First 
Amendment scrutiny because they proscribe "intent" just like inchoate offenses. People 
v. Ruppenthah 771 N.E.2d 1002, 1005-07 (111. App. Ct. 2002), cert, denied 157 L.Ed.2d 
27 (2003). These courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to Internet 
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solicitation statutes by interpreting these statutes as proscribing "conduct11 or "activity." 
Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 476-77 (Ct. App. 2000). But, these courts 
have only reached this conclusion by noting a "crucial" distinction: these statutes target 
not just thought or speech but specifically an "intent" to entice a minor to engage in 
illegal sex. kL at 475; see United States v. Owen. 228 F.3d 637, 639 (6th Cir. 2000), cert, 
denied 532 U.S. 1009 (2001); Laughner v. State. 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002), cert, denied 155 L.Ed.2d 849 (2003); Foley. 731 N.E.2d at 129; State v. 
Backlund. 2003 ND 184, ^ [29, 32, 2003 N.D. LEXIS 198; see also State v. Robins. 646 
N.W.2d 287, 297 n.12 (Wise), cert, denied 537 U.S. 1003 (2002) (citing other cases). 
"[T]he element of criminal intent 'transforms mere recitation of "loose" words which 
may mandate first amendment protection into a criminal offense.5" Ruppenthal. 771 
N.E.2d at 1005 (quoting People v. Lewis. 406 N.E.2d 11,15 (111. App. Ct. 1980)). 
Because the solicitation and attempt statutes address the identical intent listed in 
the Internet enticement statute, those three statutes target identical conduct. Any other 
interpretation would raise free speech problems by focusing on the content of the speech 
rather than the "activity" of intending to commit a crime. Hatch. 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 477. 
The legislature's focus on the actor's intent in all three crimes renders the Internet 
enticement statute indistinguishable from solicitation and attempt. By eliminating and 
then requiring the very same conduct, the plain language of the Internet enticement 
statute is "internally inconsistent." Nelson. 905 P.2d at 876. 
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C. The Legislative History and Construction of 
the Internet Enticement Statute Provide No 
Aid in Reconciling That Statute's 
Contradictory Terms. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the Internet enticement statute was 
ambiguous, the legislative history includes no indication of how the legislature intended 
that statute to differ from solicitation and attempt. That statute was adopted with no 
debate or any other insight into the legislature's reasons for including the phrase "not 
amounting to an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation." Even assuming that this Court 
could discern the legislature's main purpose in including contradictory terms, the 
irreconcilable provisions of the Internet enticement statute fail to provide any means to 
carry out that purpose. Further, comparisons to other statutes are unavailing because 
those statutes encourage the filing of more serious charges, whereas the Internet 
enticement statute created a new inchoate offense that is punished like other inchoate 
crimes rather than more serious offenses. 
The legislative history of the Internet enticement statute provides no help in 
determining the meaning of that statute's conflicting requirements. When a statute is 
ambiguous, this Court may "seek guidance from the legislative history." Worthen, 926 
P.2d at 866. The legislature enacted the Internet enticement statute in 2001. See 2001 
Utah Laws, ch. 353, §1 (effective April 30, 2001). The legislature extensively revised 
the bill for that provision, but the bill file contains no hint of the legislature's intent in 
enacting the bill into law. See Bill File, House Bill 181, 54th Utah Leg., 2001 Gen. Sess. 
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at http://www.image.le.state.ut.us/imaging/bill.asp. Further, because both houses of the 
legislature unanimously adopted the final draft of that bill without any debate on the 
measure, the legislative history provides no insight into determining the legislature's 
intent in including contradictory requirements. Floor Debate, 54th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. 
(February 13, 2001) (House Recording no. 1, counter# 1946); Floor Debate, 54th Utah 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (February 21, 2001) (Senate Recording 33, counter# 2460); Floor 
Debate, 54th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (February 27, 2001) (Senate Recording 43, counter# 
1937). 
Even if this Court could define the exact "purpose the act was meant to achieve," 
the contradictory provisions in the Internet enticement statute provide no means to 
accomplish that purpose. Gutierrez, 972 P.2d at 915. The Internet enticement statute 
obviously seeks to protect minors from being lured over the Internet for sex. 
RuppenthaL 771 N.E.2d at 1006. But, even when the "purpose in enacting [a statute] can 
be surmised," the legislature must identify the "means chosen" to achieve that purpose. 
State v. Wagstaff. 794 P.2d 118, 123-24 (Ariz. 1990). Here, the legislature stated 
conflicting requirements to protect minors, thus preventing this Court from identifying 
the means to carry out the legislature's purpose. Id. 
The only way to reconcile the competing provisions of the Internet enticement 
statute would be to "render certain viable parts meaningless and void." Nelson, 905 P.2d 
at 876. As explained more fully below, because it "lies within the province of our 
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legislature" rather than the appellate courts to correct contradictory statutes, this Court 
must defer to the legislature to resolve the conflict. Id_ Thus, even though this Court 
may be able to identify the exact purpose behind the Internet enticement statute, this 
Court cannot "choose which statement controls." Id. 
The State's references below to other statutes similarly provide no aid in 
discerning the conflicting terms of the Internet enticement statute. Although Utah 
appellate courts have interpreted other statutes that include the phrase "not amounting to" 
another crime, the reasoning underlying those cases does not apply here. Specifically, 
the Internet enticement statute targets distinct conduct-luring minors over the Internet. 
In contrast, the cases addressing the "not amounting to" language in other statutes hold 
that the legislature's purpose behind that phrase was "to encourage criminal punishment 
under th[e] greater crimes when the evidence in a particular case warrants it." State v. 
Montova, 910 P.2d 441, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). As the Utah Supreme Court 
reasoned, this conclusion makes sense because it would be "inimical to the interests of 
the accused" to "require the State to prove there was no rape, - a greater crime, - in order 
to prove a lesser crime." State v. Peters, 550 P.2d 199, 199 (Utah 1976) (emphasis in 
original). According to these decisions, the legislature's preference for pursuing a 
greater crime required the State to "ignore proof as to lack of any greater offense.'" 
State v. Reed. 2000 UT 68, ^ |33, 8 P.3d 1025 (quoting Peters., 550 P.2d at 199-200). The 
hearing judge below adopted this reasoning in concluding that the Internet enticement 
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statute encouraged the filing of first degree attempt charges under Title 76, Chapter 5, 
part 4 of the Utah Code. R. 147: 9. That part creates first degree felonies, punishable for 
three years to life, for sex crimes involving children, including: (1) rape of a child; (2) 
object rape of a child; (3) sodomy on a child; and, (4) aggravated sexual abuse of a child. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-402.1 (1999), 76-5-402.3 (Supp. 2003), 76-5-403.1 (1999), 76-
5-404.1 (1999); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102(2)(c) (Supp. 2003) (classifying 
punishment for these crimes). 
But, the Internet enticement statute significantly differs from the sex crimes 
containing the "not amounting to" language. First, unlike those statutes, the legislature 
placed the Internet enticement statute in the part of the Utah Code entitled "Inchoate 
Offenses." Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 et. seq. (defining inchoate crimes of attempt, 
conspiracy, and solicitation). This placement shows a legislative intent to create a 
specific inchoate offense addressing the Internet, not a desire to encourage filing of 
greater charges. In contrast, the statutes at issue in Reed, Peters, and Montoya were 
codified in the Utah Code with other sex crimes. Reed, 2000 UT 68,ffi[32-33, 8 P.3d 
1025 (construing Utah Code Annotated section 76-5-404.1 (sexual abuse of a child)); 
Peters, 550 P.2d at 199-200 (construing Utah Code Annotated section 76-5-404 (forcible 
sexual abuse)); Montoya, 910 P.2d at 445 (construing Utah Code Annotated section 76-
7-102 (incest)). The listing of Internet enticement as an inchoate offense demonstrates 
that the legislature viewed Internet enticement as needing its own specific crime rather 
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than showing an intent to encourage the filing of more serious sex crime charges. 
Second, the sentencing scheme under the Internet enticement statute supports the 
legislature's intent to treat it like an inchoate crime. Unlike the other statutes with the 
"not amounting to" language, the Internet enticement statute is defined as an "Inchoate 
Offense[],f which is punishable one degree lower than the offense supporting the crime 
attempted or solicited. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(3) (Supp. 2002). This sentencing 
scheme is consistent with attempt and solicitation crimes that are similarly punishable 
one degree lower than the underlying offense. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-102 (Supp. 
2003), 76-4-204 (1999). Had the legislature intended to encourage the filing of more 
serious charges it would have either made this intent explicit in the Interment enticement 
statute or placed it in the same code sections as other similarly worded sex offenses. 
Third, the Utah Code supports concluding that Internet enticement is to be treated 
as a distinct inchoate offense. Utah Code Annotated section 76-4-301 (1999) directs 
prosecutors to charge the more "specific offense" "[wjhenever any offense specifically 
designates or defines an attempt or conspiracy and provides a penalty for the attempt or 
conspiracy other than provided in this chapter . . . " The Internet enticement statute 
"specifically designates" an attempt crime and "provides a penalty for the attempt." Id. 
Thus, when a person solicits or attempts to solicit sex over the Internet from a minor, 
section 76-4-301 requires prosecutors to charge the more specific inchoate crime of using 
the Internet to lure a minor. This specific language demonstrates that Internet enticement 
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is a distinct inchoate offense and not an alternative to a more serious sex crime. 
Fourth, the recent amendment to the Internet enticement statute conclusively 
establishes that the legislature did not intend to encourage the filing of more serious 
charges under that statute. The 2003 legislature eliminated the phrase "not amounting to 
an attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation" from the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) 
(Supp. 2003). If the legislature truly intended to promote the filing of more serious 
charges as the hearing judge reasoned, it would not have eliminated the "not amounting 
to" language as construed by Reed, Peters, and Montoya. Instead, the legislature would 
have kept that language knowing that Utah appellate courts have defined the legislature's 
policy. Presumably, the legislature was aware of the law when it enacted the Internet 
enticement statute. Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355, 359 (Utah 1941) (legislature 
presumed to know Utah Supreme Court rulings); In re W.C.P., 1999 UT App 35, ^21, 
974 P.2d 302 (all presumed to know the law). At the very least, the legislature could 
have amended the Internet enticement statute to specify that it preferred the charging of 
higher crimes. Instead, the elimination of the "not amounting to" languages confirms 
that the omitted language was not necessary to the legislature's purpose in punishing 
Internet solicitors. 
By eliminating the contradictory language, the legislature indisputably 
demonstrated its intent to charge solicitors of sex from minors over the Internet as a 
second degree felony. Just like other inchoate offenses, the Internment enticement 
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statute criminalizes the mere act of soliciting sex from minors, not the actual act of 
engaging in sexual activity. Ruppenthah 771 N.E.2d at 1005. In sum, unlike the statutes 
in the cases that the State and the hearing judge relied on, this Court cannot dismiss the 
plain language of the Internet enticement statute as mere surplusage based on a 
legislative goal to encourage the punishment of greater offenses. Rather, the plain 
language of that statute, its legislative history, and construction all lead to the same 
irreconcilable conclusion that the Internment enticement statute hopelessly contradicts. 
Accordingly, that statute defines no crime at all. Nelson, 905 P.2d at 876. 
D. When the Plain Language of a Statute is 
Contradictory, the Separation of Powers 
Doctrine Bars this Court from Rewriting a 
Statute and, Instead, Requires this Court to 
Return the Statute to the Legislature for 
Redrafting. 
Because the Internet enticement statute is plain but contradictory, the separation of 
powers doctrine requires the legislature to redraft that statute. This Court lacks power to 
rewrite defective statutes. That power is purely a legislative function outside the 
constitutionally designated authority of this Court. But, because the legislature has 
already amended the Internet enticement statute, this Court need only reverse Mr. 
Hunsaker's conviction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that appellate courts must defer to the 
legislature when statutes irreconcilably conflict. In Nelson, the Court ruled that when the 
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language of a statute is plain but "internally inconsistent," courts must invalidate the 
statute and allow the legislature to correct the inconsistency. 905 P.2d at 876. Under the 
separation of powers doctrine, "the power to remedy this inconsistency lies within the 
province of our legislature." IdL This doctrine "bars the judicial branch from exercising 
any of the functions reserved to another branch of government." Evans & Sutherland 
Computer Corp. v. Utah State Tax Common.. 953 P.2d 435, 443 (Utah 1997) (construing 
Utah Constitution, Article V, section 1). Legislative action is necessary to reconcile the 
conflicting provisions of a statute because courts have no power to "render certain viable 
parts meaningless and void." Nelson, 905 P.2d at 876. "To choose which statement 
controls over the whole would amount to legislation by judicial fiat." Id. 
Remedying contradictory statutes goes beyond the judicial function of interpreting 
legislative intent. That power "is limited by the constitutionally decreed separation of 
powers that prohibits this Court from enacting legislation or redrafting defective 
statutes." Wagstaff, 794 P.2d at 123. "'A court cannot, under the guise of construction, 
rewrite a statute, supply omissions, or make other changes . . . " State v. Hamilton, 340 
N.W.2d 397, 400 (Neb. 1983) (quoting Bessev v. Board of Education Lands & Funds , 
178 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Neb. 1970)); see also Ex parte Windom. 840 So. 2d 885, 890 
(Ala. 2002) (until the Legislature acts, courts "cannot rewrite [] statute[s] to reach" even 
a desirable result). LI In this case, the legislature has already redrafted the Internet 
enticement statute and removed the conflicting requirements. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-
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401 (Supp. 2003). Thus, Mr. Hunsaker requests this Court to reverse his conviction that 
was obtained under an invalid statute. Provo City v. Whatcott, 2000 UT App 86,1J16, 1 
P.3d 1113. 
II. THE INTERNET ENTICEMENT STATUTE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
Moreover, the Internet enticement statute is unconstitutionally vague because it 
fails "to inform persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must be to conform to 
its requirements . .." Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 (Utah 1974). Requiring the 
State to prove both no attempt or solicitation crime and that a person has solicited or 
attempted to solicit a minor deprives an average citizen of notice of prohibited conduct. 
Because these requirements negate each other, the statute fails to define what conduct is 
criminal. The statute is so conflicting that it also unconstitutionally gives law 
enforcement unfettered discretion to determine what conduct constitutes a crime. 
The Internet enticement statute fails to provide a reasonable person adequate 
notice of what conduct is prohibited. "A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it: (1) fails 
to provide a 'person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is 
prohibited.'; (2) 'impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of 
arbitrary and discriminatory application'; or (3) inhibits the exercise of First Amendment 
freedoms." State v. Germonto. 2003 UT App 217, %\ 1, 73 P.3d 978 (quoting Gravned v. 
25 
CitvofRockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972)); see also State v. Krueger. 1999 UT App 
54, ^[23, 975 P.2d 489 (Ma statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently 
explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited and does so in a manner 
that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."). 
In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, this Court presumes that statutes are 
valid and it resolves any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. State v. 
Hawkins, 967 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, criminal statutes must be 
clear to provide defendants sufficient notice of what conduct may lead to the deprivation 
of their personal liberty. "'[N]othing is a crime which is not clearly and unmistakably 
made a crime.'" State v. Lambert, 514 So. 2d 550, 552 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 
State v. Truby, 29 So. 2d 758, 762 (La. 1947)). Likewise, "any ambiguity [in a criminal 
statute] must be resolved in favor of the defendant." Germonto, 2003 UT App 217, [^10, 
73P.3d978. 
The Internet enticement statute is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to 
identify what conduct constitutes a crime. As explained above, that statute defines a 
crime as not constituting an "attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation" but goes on to define 
the prohibited conduct as a solicitation or attempt crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-401(1) 
(Supp. 2002). Describing Internet enticement as an effort to "solicit, seduce, lure, or 
entice, or attempt to solicit, seduce, lure, or entice a minor" to engage in illicit sex is 
identical to the definitions for solicitation and attempt offenses. Because the statute 
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completely negates itself, it fails to "inform the ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited . . ." Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, %L3, 975 P.2d 489; United States v. Cardiff. 
344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). No reasonable construction of that statute can save it given 
these blatant contradictions. State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT App 305, ^ [8, 989 P.2d 503. 
The Internet enticement statute is as conflicting as a Louisiana statute that 
criminalized the possession of "'apomorhine'" but exempted possession of "'isoquinoline 
alkaloids of opium.'" Lambert, 514 So. 2d at 552 (quoting former Louisiana Revised 
Statutes Annotated section 40: 967). Expert testimony established that apomorhine was 
an isoquinoline alkaloid of opium. Id. The Louisiana Court of Appeals ruled that these 
"contradictory" terms were unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 553. Because the statute 
could not be reconciled, the court ruled that no crime occurred. Id.; see People v. 
Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 44 (111. 1987) (statute that required one mens rea under the 
definition of a crime and a different mens rea under the punishment section for that crime 
"directly conflicted]"). The Internet enticement statute similarly fails to state a crime 
given its contradictory requirements. 
A statute is vague when it is so "'conflicting and inconsistent in its provisions that 
it cannot be executed.5" See Commonwealth v. Harbst, 763 A.2d 953, 957 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 2000) (quoting Pennsylvania Builders Association v. Dep't of Revenue , 552 A.2d 
730, 737 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) (internal citations omitted)). Basic fairness, as 
guaranteed under due process of law, entitles a person "to know what is expected of him 
27 
[or her] without being confused by vague and conflicting commands." State v. Barney , 
448 P.2d 195, 197 (Idaho 1968). "A State may not issue commands to its citizens, under 
criminal sanctions, in language so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of 
what conduct might transgress them." Ralevv. Ohio. 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959); see 
Cardiff, 344 U.S. at 176 (criminal statutes must give "fair warning"). The conflict in the 
Internet enticement statute creates vague and contradictory commands that no reasonable 
person can follow. Barney, 448 P.2d at 197. Accordingly, that statute is 
unconstitutionally vague. Id. 
The Internet enticement statute also unconstitutionally gives law enforcement 
unbridled discretion to decide what conduct constitutes a crime. Statutes are also vague 
when they grant law enforcement officials "virtually unrestrained power . . . to arrest and 
charge persons with a violation." Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). Under the Internet enticement statute, the police have enormous discretion 
to arrest Internet users who even appear to be engaging in sexual discussions with 
minors. For example, the statute gives law enforcement and prosecutors broad latitude to 
determine whether a person simply "believes" another person to be a minor. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-401(1) (Supp. 2002). Without more definite guidance from the legislature, 
the police have power to detain and arrest persons for innocent or joking 
communications. The failure to eliminate protected conduct from the statute 
"encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, 
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TI23,975P.2d489. 
This situation is similar to the ordinance at issue in City of Chicago v. Morales, 
527 U.S. 41, 60-61 (1999), that allowed the police to disperse groups who gathered for 
"'no apparent purpose."1 (Quoting ordinance). Because this phrase granted the police 
unfettered discretion to assess a person's motives for gathering, the Supreme Court ruled 
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. The Internet enticement statute suffers 
from the same defect by granting the police discretion to determine persons' beliefs and 
the nature of their sexual conversations. This wide discretion creates potential for abuse 
and fails to provide law enforcement officials adequate guidance in enforcing the statute. 
Huber, 786 P.2dat 1376. 
III. THE CONFLICTING LANGUAGE OF THE INTERNET 
ENTICEMENT STATUTE PREVENTS A REASONABLE 
JURY FROM FINDING GUILT BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
The language of the Internet enticement statute is so muddled that the State cannot 
establish sufficient evidence of a crime. Because the terms of the statute directly conflict, 
no reasonable person could understand the required elements for proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. As with the preceding arguments, it is impossible to establish guilt 
under the Internet enticement statute because that statute fails to state a crime at all. 
The contradictory terms of the Internet enticement statute create too much 
confusion for a jury to convict a defendant for Internet enticement. To convict a person, 
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the jury must conclude that the State has presented adequate evidence from which a 
reasonable person could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. H awkins, 
967 P.2d at 971. Reversal is required on appeal "when the evidence is so inconclusive or 
inherently improbable" that reasonable persons must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
about the defendant's guilt. State v. Waldron, 2002 UT App 175, TflO, 51 P.3d 21 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
Given the convoluted terms of the Internet enticement statute, no reasonable juror 
could find a person guilty under that statute. The Internet enticement statute is 
incomprehensible because it requires the State to prove both the existence and the 
nonexistence of a solicitation or an attempt. "The standard announced in the statute fails 
to describe a crime and the elements constituting the crime in a clear, prospective manner 
as required by criminal law." Hamilton, 340 N.W.2d at 399. The impossibility of 
finding the existence and the nonexistence of a solicitation or an attempt requires 
reversal. Waldron. 2002 UT App 175, IflO, 51 P.3d 21. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hunsaker requests this Court to invalidate the Internet enticement statute and 
to reverse his conviction under that provision. 
SUBMITTED t h i s ^ d a y of December, 2003. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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Prosecutor: PAUL G. AMANN 
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Defendant's Attorney(s): MICHAEL A PETERSON 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 26, 1959 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 1:37 
CHARGES 
1. ENTICING A MINOR OVER THE INTERNET - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 01/13/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ENTICING A MINOR OVER THE 
INTERNET a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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